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Abstract 
 
We argue that preferences for secession are the expression of  common 
unobserved factors determining national identity, and accordingly that “identity 
matters”. This paper examines the hypothesis of support for secession 
(independent Euskadi) and Basque national identity as being dependent in the 
light of a reformulation of Akerloff and Kranton (2000). We examine observed  
economic determinants of individuals’ national identity (and their perceived 
“imagined community” or nation)  formation as well as those that influence the 
propensity of individuals to support the secession..  We undertake econometric 
survey analysis for the Basque Country using a bivariate probit model and 
publicly available data from the Spanish Centre for Sociological Research. Our 
results suggest evidence of a common determination of  national identity and 
political preferences for the secession of the Basque Country consistently with 
Akerloff and Kranton model.     
 
Keywords: secession, national identity, imagined community, Basque Country.  
JEL: D78, D72, H19. 
 
 
Resum 
En aquest article argumentem que les preferències per un estat independent 
són l’expressió de factors comuns d’invoservables associats a la identitat nacional. 
Examinem el paper de la identitat per explicar un fenòmen  de cauire político-
econòmic: el suport a la secessió.  En particular,  analitzem empíricament la hipòtesi 
d’independència de la identitat nacional basca i la preferència respecte d’un Euskadi 
independent seguint Akerlof i Kranton (2000). Fem una anàlisi que inclou alguns 
determinants econòmics de la formulació de la identitat nacional (de la seva 
respectiva “comunitat imaginaria” o nació)  i del  suport per la independència.  Hem 
fet servir una modelització econometrica que segueix un probit bivariant així com una 
base de dades fetes  públiques pel Centre d’Investigacions Sociològiques  . Els nostres 
resultats indiquen una evidència robusta  de la formació simultània  entre les 
preferències per la independència del País Basc i la identitat nacional basca.  
 
Paraules clau: secessió,  identitat nacional, comunitat imaginaria, País Basc. 
JEL: D78, D72, H19 
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1. Introduction 
 
We human beings normally have both an individual and collective sense of 
self; arguably both are regarded as key determinants of  both preferences and action. 
However, in mainstream rational choice theory, the role of identity has been neglected 
with few exceptions (Sen, 1985, Landa, 1994). Nonetheless, some recent 
contributions have boosted the role of identity as explaining some features that 
influence significantly peoples actions such as ‘feminism’ and ‘ethnicity’. Certainly, 
the breakthrough of the economics of identity is the seminal contribution of Akerloff 
and Kranton (2000), where they systematise the influence of identity as underlying 
individuals’ preferences. Yet, to the best of our knowledge, empirical evidence on the 
role of identity in determining collective and political action (Olson, 1971) has 
received limited examination. Collective action might be rooted in individual identity 
in several ways.  Identity creates non-monetary payoffs for certain behaviours that 
traditional models do not normally take into account. Indeed, from undertaking 
identity-based decisions, individuals might obtain identity-based payoffs both from 
their own actions as well as from those of others. Thus, we argue that identity is 
envisaged as a preliminary – though simultaneously determined – step  for individuals 
to embark into collective action or to support such collective action. Furthermore, we 
claim that identity operates in such a way that it fosters individuals’ preferences to 
favour certain behaviours that, if violated, would cause psychological costs or 
frustration with their perceived self1. 
 
Besides individual identity, collective identity takes a variety of forms that 
influence individuals’ action and might determine the structure and the social 
cohesion of a political community. Among dimensions of collective identity stands 
‘national identity’, which has been argued to influence economic behaviour - e.g. the 
acceptance of a common currency in the European Union as in Meier-Pesti and 
Kirchler, (2003)- . National identity departs from the ‘uniqueness’ of each national 
identity in the realm of the set of national identities at an international arena, which 
                                                 
1 Although identity is subject to societal change, a certain identity may have meaning for certain 
individuals and evoke responses in others, especially if  the expression of certain identities might 
question the existence of a competing alternative 
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still plays a role in both individually and collectively driven decisions2.  That is, in a 
world made up of nation-states, every single person falls into a category of different 
‘national identities’, though not necessarily national identity coincides with that of the 
state identity, and not necessarily all nationals from a nation-state might adhere to 
their identity. Indeed, since the creation of nation states in the nineteen century, 
persistent heterogeneity in national identity has remained in some states such as 
Spain, where an increasing majority of citizens see the Basque Country or Catalonia 
as their nation. Interestingly enough, peripheral national identity appears as 
comparable and sometimes in conflict with nation state identity.  Although lacking 
institutionalisation in the form of a state, peripheral national identity has remained 
latent within some nation-states without leading to an additional state structure, giving 
rise to ‘state-less nations’ (SLN) legally embraced in nation-states (Guibernau, 1999, 
2000; Keating, 2001)3.  These are political entities recognizable by a relatively 
homogeneous population, sharing a common identity and cultural symbols but not 
necessarily identified with ethnic or minority groups on the one hand, nor states on 
the other.  
 
The flourishing of such national identities it is likely to give rise to apparent 
collective action demanding institutional changes within those nation–states, 
including secession. Indeed, the univocal end  of the revival of peripheral national 
identities is the increasing support for the set up of a new state made out of a process 
of “democratic secession” - as it is the case of Quebec attempts, Slovakia and more 
next May Montenegro -. However, SLN objectives often conflicts with nation-state’s 
integrity and the uniformity which might lead to competitive inter-governmental 
relationships amongst them (Breton and Franschini, 2003), especially when SLN have 
some devolved governmental powers. Even if in most SLN some devolution 
movements have taken place, they does not necessarily imply recognition of the state 
multinational character - e.g. Spain, Italy, UK, among other are not defined as 
multinational but unitary states-, and hence the competitive nature of national 
identities with nation-state identity remains. Some studies using two decade data on 
                                                 
2 People still exhibit a seen of solidarity with other individuals that share the same national identity in 
some areas of life such as in supporting a football team, a tennis player. Newspapers frequently quote 
the nationality of celebrities to enhance public support. 
3 There is a comprehensible number of SLN in Europe, including Catalonia, the Basque Country, 
Flanders, Quebec, Scotland and Galicia, among others 
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national identity even suggest using public data that political decentralisation has 
fostered the creation of recent ‘imagined communities’ within the Spanish State that 
did not existed before  (Martinez-Herrera, 2002). However, whilst its is true that 
devolution provides regional governments with public policy instruments to promote 
their national identity, the formation of national identity does not take place in two 
decades but it must have be anchored in previous experience, possibly has been 
inherited from pre-modern times.  
 
In the case of Spanish Catalan, Galician and Basque nationalism their 
movements date back more than a century now.  Thus, one might hypothesize that 
institutional developments conferring further political power to SLN and the progress 
of their national identity might be simultaneously determined, whereby political 
demand for autonomy or power has its limit in secession. Accordingly, growth of 
national identity might be expected to encompass a latent preference for opting out of 
the state. On the other hand, one might argue that secession is potentially mitigated by 
the limitations of collective action as well the prospect of some confrontation with 
those supporting the status quo for any other reason.   However, regardless of the 
well-known limits to the expression of collective actions, whether national identity is 
simultaneously determined with preferences for secession is a question that can be 
empirically scrutinized.   As we claim, supportive evidence for this feature provides 
additional empirical confirmation of Akerloff and Kranton (2000), whereby identity 
determines preferences and thus action.  
 
Recent literature on the political economy of secession stresses the rational 
nature of secession, and in particular the costs and benefits of membership of 
wider countries (Alesina et al, 2000, Alesina, 2003) as determining rational 
support for secession. These studies conclude that, as a result of the process of 
economic integration, some borders in Europe and elsewhere might become 
endogenous. However, little evidence has yet been reported on individuals’ 
preferences for secession and its determinants. One the other hand, costs and 
benefits are not necessarily perceived by individuals, and accordingly individual 
data should be examined. Indeed, some well known cognitive biases ( e.g., status 
quo effects) might inhibit the individuals capacity to provide credibility to the 
scenario of a future independent state. This paper examines the role of national 
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identity in determining collective preferences for state opting-out or secession. We 
argue that the development of national identity is simultaneously determined by 
preferences for secession as well as those of other individuals in the same 
community. This feature, if empirically confirmed as we claim, indicates that the 
development of national identities following the Akerloff and Kranton (2000) 
model determines certain preferences towards collective organisation of the policy 
in the form   of a separate sate4.  
 
We believe the Basque Country is an interesting case to study the decision 
to opt out. The size is relatively small, less than 2 million. Following Olson 
(1971), group size is inversely related to successful collective action. Indeed, if 
nationality is a public good provided by the "largest" individual, who is more 
likely to benefit the most, the larger the group, the smaller the capacity of one 
actor to cover the costs, and therefore the larger the suboptimality. If the size of 
the group exceeds a given threshold, no member, no matter how large, will be able 
to provide any quantity of the collective good. Furthermore, collective action is 
likely to take place the more homogeneous the group is and the higher the 
cooperation within its members (Finkel and Muller, 1998). 
 
The paper is organised as follows. The next section deals with the political 
economy of separation and nationalisms. Section three deals with the political 
economy of nationalism and self-determination. Section four describes the model 
and section five the results. A final section forms the conclusion.  
                                                 
4 A widespread restriction to the use of the right of self- determination was the assertion that it was 
only designed for colonial countries and not for others. However, the disintegration of the USSR and 
Yugoslavia has led to a new interpretation of the right to self-determination based on the “maintenance 
of a peaceful and just world order” (Freeman, 1998). Therefore, secession is justified by injustice 
towards those that do not belong to the ruling ethos and might not be able to express themselves in a 
wider political entity.  The right to self-determinations results from the right to political association and 
reflects the willingness of people to live together in separate units 
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2. The political economy of nationalism and secession 
 
2.1 Nationalisms and selfishness 
 
Nationalism stands as a general phenomenon determining individual’s 
attachment to specific cultures, common economic and political interests and 
geographical specificity5. Yet, explanations of the emergence of nationalism are 
multiple and are often grounded in economic reasons (Gellner, 1983). Indeed, 
following Pagano (2003) economic development in western societies has resulted 
from the marriage of national state and culture that delivered a homogenous culture 
(cultural standardization), which decreased the costs of high mobility mainly in urban 
areas. Given the relevance of nationalism, it is important to examine, from an 
economic standpoint, the influence on individual as well as collective behaviour. 
Interestingly, mainstream neoclassical economics has long postulated a model of 
rational choice, which underlies a view of the individual that is incompatible with the 
existence of collective identity. The methodology of neo-classical economics entails 
the testing of prediction based on postulates of individuals exclusively as the seekers 
of self-interest.  Some scholars (Johnson, 1965; Kindlberger, 1973) consider ‘national 
sentiment’ to be an example of ‘irrational instincts’ not grounded on economic 
principles. The exception is when collective identity is understood exclusively as an 
opportunity to seek rents. That is, pursuing a larger share of the national wealth by 
defining nations and nationality to one's advantage (Breton 1964). Breton argues that 
nationalism characteristically redistributes wealth between ‘nationals’ and 
‘foreigners,’ and in particular favours ‘the middle classes’ (see Breton, 1964 and 
Breton and Breton, 1995). Breton (1964, 1978) explicitly states that the middle class 
and members of the same ethnic group are the ones that benefit from those rewards 
rather than the working class.  Thus, investing in national identity leads to specific 
rewards, either monetary (e.g. higher income, jobs etc) or non-monetary (e.g. higher 
national pride), which in turn are not profitable for everyone. Similarly, other scholars 
follow Breton’s approach arguing that moves towards secession are explained by the 
                                                 
5 An important distinction should be made between patriotism and nationalism (Bar-Tal, 1993, 
Kosterman et al, 1989). Patriotism refers to the emotional attachment to one’s own nation while 
nationalism refers to a discrimination process whereby one’s own nation is evaluated  positively and 
another nation is devalued.  
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so-called “frustration of the rich”. That is, the inhabitants of the most prosperous parts 
of the country hinder the economic exploitation by the poor parts of the country 
(Salomon, 2000). 
 
Yet empirical evidence seems to have questioned Breton’s prediction, 
especially because nationalist movements might be heterogeneous around the world. 
For instance, whilst in developing countries these theories might well apply to certain 
countries where social class is polarised, it is hard to believe that in countries where 
the middle class is the vast majority of the population this would apply. In such cases, 
the middle classes would be expected to lead political majorities in the parliament and 
thus secession would be a very apparent and non-divisive issue. Furthermore, Watkins 
(1978) explicitly discusses the weaknesses of Breton’s (1964) approach as regards the 
Canadian framework. However, even if this is the case, as Breton (1978) recognises, 
it is virtually impossible to demonstrate that nationalism leads to redistribution of 
wealth to the autochthonous and the middle classes within an area. Finally, 
nationalism can be seen as a consumer good demanded by a group to overcome the 
homogeneity of contemporary culture, combined with the feelings of historical 
oppression along with economic forces where the regions might be contributing more 
to the national budget, and this might explain sentiments supporting secession. The 
feeling for secession is thus latent in some individuals when they feel that the state 
does not meet the demands of the population. 
 
Individuals, when confronting institution building, are affected by 
psychological mechanisms mediating between structural, cultural and ideological 
consideration and action. Support for secession can be seen as providing 
psychological benefits. On the other hand, some individuals might be risk-averse to 
the possible ‘nationalistic consequences’ that might be enhanced by the nation-states 
through counter anti-secessionist polices to counteract a possible move towards self-
determination. Finally, even when people identify the ‘net benefits’ of secession, they 
might discount benefits more than costs, which might mean that the benefits do not 
outweigh the immediate transition costs. 
 
Recent literature on the political economy of secession argues that economic 
integration has removed trade and monetary policy from nation-states’ discretion. 
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Therefore, far from increasing, economic reasons for nation-state adhesion seems to 
be decreasing (Alesina et al, 2000). Indeed, it is argued that richer regions are more 
likely to seek sovereignty or self-determination to avoid continuing to pay transfers to 
other poorer regions (Buchanan and Faith, 1987 and Young, 2002). Another 
explanation relies on identity and ethnic motivations. When a single ethnic group 
dominates politics in multiethnic countries, then there are incentives for minority 
groups to opt out.    Other authors argue that small countries may benefit from opting 
out from conglomerate NS, such as Yugoslavia and the USSR (Milanovic, 1996).  
 
 
2.2 National identity and non-monetary pay-offs of secession 
 
 
The proliferation of separatist political parties in many nation-states arguably 
constitutes a platform for the expression of identity-based decisions. An individual’s 
participation in politics as well as the evolution of the right to freedom and self-
determination have led to the perception that states are not immutable organisations 
but determined by the individual’s will and national attachment as expressed by 
democratic means. Therefore, if some countries were to be designed from scratch, and 
citizenship were to rely on people’s willingness to enter specific groups, one might 
well speculate that some states would not exist while others would emerge. 
Conversely, the structure of most unitary states has developed through the adoption of 
nationalist forces throughout history. However, due to regional integration, as well as 
the need for a strong Leviathan protecting one nation from another, one might argue 
that specific group identities that previously refrained from expressing their sense of 
identity will emerge. In this setting, some countries exhibit some manifest 
disconformities between a specific group identity and that of the nation-state. Thus, 
some cast doubt on the desirability of maintaining state designs in those areas where 
state identity precludes another stronger identity in conflict with the state identity. 
 
One of the areas where nation states still enjoy discretion is national identity 
and maintaining national cohesion, though nationalist policies. One might argue that 
because nation-states are established as formal political institutions, the costs of 
secession might result from any negative consequences of secession to an individual’s 
well being (e.g. tax increases, regulatory shifts, etc.), while individual benefits might 
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result from a higher proximity and loyalty to their state. An individual’s attachment to 
national identities is often regarded as determining acceptance of supra-national 
organisations as well as existing states as they are. National identity might not be 
equally intense across individuals, and identity-based decisions might enhance some 
costs, (e.g. social acceptance). Therefore, an alternative explanation of nationalism 
and secession is that both result from similar factors associated with the expression of 
a national identity following Akerloff and Kranton (2002). Kelman (1969) argues that 
national attachment is based on both instrumental and sentimental attachments. An 
instrumental attachment refers to a rational evaluation of the costs and benefits of 
belonging to a nation, whereby attachment results from benefits being greater than the 
costs. Thus, a nation is an instrument to reach benefits that one would not be able to 
reach individually. On the other hand, a sentimental attachment is rather an emotional 
evaluation based on symbols, tradition and culture resulting from the coincidence of 
individual and national values. Both can compensate each other. If it seems that, 
instrumentally, one part of the state is not perceived as portraying the expected 
results, under limited adhesion to nation-state, then we should expect to perceive high 
benefits from secession. 
 
Nationality formed as the result of sharing the same national identity, and can 
be conceptualised as a public good based on distinctiveness in relation to other 
nations.  Therefore, each individual should contribute very little to the production of 
nationality. However, although there is a typical free-rider problem in the production 
of nationality, nationality is a good provided by the state6. Indeed, national identity 
has been defined as a collective good with respect to those who are members, and a 
positional good which distinguishes them from the rest (Pagano, 1999). A positional 
good (e.g. prestige) is characterised by the feature that the total level of welfare or 
benefit to be derived from such goods in a market is fixed. An increase in the benefits 
from ‘consumption’ for one individual must therefore be at the expense of benefits to 
others. Therefore, national identity, although subject to manipulation, leads to 
psychological benefits when they are expressed in their collective action, e.g. in the 
                                                 
6 However, in multinational countries the state does not always defend the promotion of several 
identities equally. 
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electoral or political arena7 for those who share the same identity, while it could lead 
to important psychological costs for those who do not, and who share another one.  
 
National identity can be seen as a specific form of collective identity. Indeed, 
individuals might attain symbolic utility to act in accordance with their identity 
(Akerloff and Kranton, 2000). This results from the fact that an identity is ultimately 
chosen by an individual and implies sharing the contingency of their action with other 
nationals8. As in Nozick (1989), individuals obtain utility of what “they are” as 
symbolic utility. Many human actions lead to welfare increases by defining what 
people are in a way they find desirable. Because individuals form nations, some 
people might, in order to overcome the limitations of their own life, fight for their 
nation, as this is a way to fight for something that presumably would never die. To 
this extent some argue that nationalism results in the establishment of imagined 
communities (Andersen, 1991). National identity incorporates a psychological 
dimension that need to be considered when deciding between different institutional 
structures of a state. According to Emerson (1960) and Anderson (1987) , a nation can 
be defined as a “body of people who feel that they are a nation”, therefore being a 
self-defining group or an ‘imagined community’. A nation presupposes a past and a 
present guided by a desire to “continue a common life”. It therefore results from an 
act of imagination in which people see themselves as having something in common 
with their compatriots, either the adherence to institutions or the sense of descent 
(Renan 1990). This act of imagination happens in a ‘homogeneous empty time’, that 
is - different constituents are acting together through time - , communication between 
constituents is undertaken through  an accessible print language and the boundaries of 
social opportunity need to be coterminous with national frontiers (Reicher and 
Hopkins, 2001).  
 
Psychologically speaking, the costs and benefits of being part of a wider 
community might suffer from some well know cognitive biases such as status quo 
                                                 
7 Indeed, at the collective level,  a strong national identity (e.g. being Basque) might lead to strong 
psychological  benefits from expressing identity-based attitudes,  given that the same public good is 
shared by a large number of individuals. 
8 One might argue that in order to satisfy the need to relax the constraints of individual life, an identity 
must be such that individuals feel that they are not choosing their identity but rather that the identity 
has chosen them. 
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effects (Clarke et al, 2004) – whereby people exhibit a preference for the status quo- , 
certainty effects - distinct evaluation of certain costs and uncertain benefits from 
secession- as well as a distinct evaluation of costs and benefits (Kahneman Tversky, 
1979). Perceptions of injustice are important in determining preferences for secession 
as they influence the re-evaluation of the costs and benefits of belonging to national 
union (Brookman, 1993). Some individuals might see positive aspects such as 
economic growth and social cohesion resulting from secession which might explain 
why economic and social policy preferences might differ between different 
communities embraced in the same state (Keating, 1996). Furthermore, as is the case 
of the Basque Country, historical exploitation and depravation by previous 
undemocratic Spanish governments might still stand in the memory of their 
population, and act as an addition costs that might offset the effect of some status quo 
effect. Other important issue to point out refer to the fact that nationalism might make 
people fear the disintegration of nation-states, and therefore might cause political 
externalities. Accordingly, anti-secessionist politicians might stand against the 
expression of some people’s desires for independence by upholding the people’s 
voice. 
 
3. The institutional setting  
 
Spain stands as a nation-state formed along the lines of the unitary state 
structure since the 19th century after a process of unification which included a set of 
three civil wars which abolished the pre-modern rights (e. g. Basque foral rights) as 
they were perceived as a barrier to the Spanish single market.  However, the Spanish 
nation state did not succeed in removing significant heterogeneity in collective or 
national identity (especially in Catalonia and the Basque Country), which has 
persisted up until the late 19th century in the form of nationalist and regionalist 
movements, and has lead to the search for self-determination and occasionally 
secession was declared twice in the early thirties in Catalonia.  In this respect, Spain is 
often catalogued as a frustrated nation-state (Castells, 2001).  
 
Yet, the set up of the II Republic in Spain (1931-36) led to the recognition of 
the Basque Country as a region-state status so-called ‘autonomous community’. Yet, 
the recognition of Catalan and Basque autonomy was perceived as an attempt of state 
disintegration by some elites, and arguably was an important reason behind Franco’s 
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coup-d’état in 1936 which led to the abolishment of regional autonomy along with 
legal and language rights. However, both in exile and in the Basque Country, political 
activity was strong as well as the lobbying with the United States government to re-
establish the Basque government. However, after the agreement between the United 
States and the undemocratic Spanish state in 1953, an important young cohort of 
Basque nationalists set up an openly violent movement called ETA as a self-
determination organisation, which ended up becoming a terrorist group against the 
Spanish state though it has now ceased its actions. 
 
After Franco military regime, the Spanish Constitution (SC) was passed in 
1978 without any Basque representative in the constitutional process. Although the 
Spanish constitution only received a scarce 30% support in the Basque Country, it 
was finally ratified at the central level. As a result of the SC, 17 autonomous regions 
were set up, and among them a set of so called ‘nationalities’ which included the 
Basque Country. The difference between regions and nationalities refers to the need 
to differentiate regions according to the speed at which the decentralisation process 
took place rather than in having sovereignty, which resides exclusively in the (whole) 
Spanish peoples. Furthermore, together with Navarre, the Basque Country was 
granted a distinctive fiscal status whereby they collect their taxes and pay their 
contribution (the so-called ‘cupo’) to the Spanish state according to their traditional 
(so-called ‘foral’) laws. With the recognition of political parties, pro-independence 
parties were re-founded and nationalist movements were institutionalised.  However, 
because the country had not been de facto democratised, a coup-d’état took place in 
1981 by some members of the army nostalgic about the times of Franco. Although it 
failed to accomplish its objectives, it slowed down the decentralisation process and 
prevented any movement towards federalism when the socialist party come to power 
in 1982.     
 
After the Basque Country recovered its old institutions, an intense government 
activity took place fostering national identity and the so-called national revitalisation. 
This took the form of the promotion of the Basque language (Euskera), the promotion 
of its culture through its governmental regulatory powers and its own parliament. 
Nationalist parties in government either on their own or in coalition have always ruled 
the government of the Basque Country. Furthermore, self-determination goals have 
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always been present even as a long–term objective. However, four major issues 
changed the environment in 2003. First, the need to stop terrorism in the Basque 
Country by democratic means. This led to a call for a so-called ‘legitimacy 
referendum’ aiming at  asking the population about the legitimacy of  the right for 
self-determination rather than for independence itself. Second, the process of political 
and economic unification taking place in Europe, where a large set of small and 
recently recognised states are becoming members of the EU as sovereign states.  
Finally, a key stakeholder is the Spanish government’s attitude, blocking the 
establishment of any referendum, and even condemning anyone promoting it to five 
years in prison. Accordingly, the current status quo calls for an analysis of 
individuals’ perceptions of self-determination to examine how these perceptions are 
formed.  .  
  
  
4.  The model and the data 
 
 
4.1 The model 
 
Following Akerloff and Kranton (2000), let us assume there is a set of national 
categories  (e.g.  “Spanish” or “Basque”).   is the j’s own. N jn P  refers to the 
different prescriptive characteristics of the “ideal member of a community” (e.g. 
language, tradition) and specifies the individual’s behaviour in specific scenarios. Let 
us define  as j actions with respect to the political  status quo (e.g. preferences 
towards the entrenchment of  the Basque Country with respect to Spain) and  as 
other’s attitudes, both being arguments of j‘s utility function combined with 
national identity ) as follows: 
ja
ja−
)(⋅jU
jI(
 
                                                   (1) ),,( jjjjj IaaUU −=
 
Yet, identity  is a function of j’s assigned national categories . 
Furthermore, j’s identity depends on j’s own given characteristics 
)( jI jn
jη  and  which 
indicates the extent to which j’s individuals’ characteristic fit in with these 
P
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prescriptions of an “ideal member of a community”. Finally, j’s identity depends  on 
the extent to which individual preferences correspond with P. Thus, given the 
following function: 
 
                         ),,;,( PnaaII jjjjjj η−=                       (2) 
 
jI is assumed to determine j’s psychological distance from certain national 
categories. Therefore an individual would express those attitudes  that maximise 
(1) given  
ja
Pn jj ,,η as well as . Furthermore, individuals may be able to choose 
their national categories  . That is, individuals have the choice to ascribe to a 
specific  national category. Finally, one might ague that both N and P might change 
over time and therefore the meaning and implications of identity shift with them.  
ja−
jn
 
According to this model one might argue that preferences towards the 
status quo of a NS might change through changes of identity or prescriptions. This 
implies that national identity is endogenously and/or simultaneously determined 
within the decision to opt out. Yet, the individuals are supposed to maximize a 
utility function simultaneously determined by individuals’ attitudes to self-
determination and individuals’ national identity. The individual propensity to 
support opt-out ) is not observable like the perception of other members of the 
group  and both decisions are thus latent variables modelled as follows:  
*( jA
)( * jA−
 
                                           (3) 111
'* μβ += xAj
                                                                            (4) 222
'* μβ +=− xA j
where is a vector of expected utility benefits from opting out such as 
language promotion, business opportunities, psychological benefits, socio-
economic determinants. In our records, we do observe  and which takes the 
value of 1 if the respondents are in favour of opting out and 0 otherwise. 
Therefore, 
jx′
jA jA−
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⎩⎨
⎧ >′=− otherwise 0
 if 1
, iijj
x
AA
μβ
                                     (5) 
 
where i=1,2. Yet, identity ( *I ) is not observable either. However, our data 
contain the expressed individual identity. In particular, whether for those 
individuals Euskadi is ‘their nation’.  As before, we can model this as follows: 
 
                                                                                  (6) iizI εδ +′=*
 
Our sample allows us to identify those that declare their nation being the 
Basque Country regarded  as  - that takes the value of 1 if the individual’s 
nation is the Basque Country and 0 otherwise - as follows:  
iI
 
                                                            (7) 
⎩⎨
⎧ >=
otherwise 0
0 if 1 *I
I i
 
Yet, from (2) (3) and (6) we can write the bivariate normal distribution as 
~ (BivN ),, ρβδ ii xz ′′ , where ρ denotes the correlation matrix of the error terms of the 
two processes underlined in (2) and (4). If the correlation ρ coefficient of the error 
terms turns out to be positive this would provide us with evidence in favour of the role 
of identity in shifting individuals’ political preference toward opting out. 
 
4.2 The data and variables 
 
The data employed in this study are an official survey undertaken by the 
Centre for Sociological Research (CIS) in Spain in 2001 (study number 2407).  The 
survey is representative of the Basque Country and consisted of 2500 interviews with 
a random sample of the population of the Basque Country. The same survey has been 
applied to other Spanish regions with the aim of gathering information on individuals’ 
perceptions on the institutions and autonomous communities in Spain.  The variables 
included in the model are classified as follows (Table 2).  The variables chosen to 
determine individuals’ identity   are the responses to the follow question: 
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Question: Which term do you prefer using when you refer to the Basque Country? 
Responses: A nation, A region, Neither of them, DK/NA. (Q11, CIS 2407) 
 
Individuals’ view of other preferences for secession are observed from the 
following question:  
  
Question: Do you think that the majority of citizens from your community are in 
favour or against self-determination proposals? (Q24, CIS 2407) 
Responses: (more) In favour, (more) Against, DK/NA 
 
Finally, individuals’ preferences for secession result from the following 
question:  
 
Question: Personally, would you be in favour of the Basque country becoming an 
independent country? (Q25, CIS 2407) 
Responses: (more) In favour, (more) Against, DK/NA 
 
In determining which variables to include in the model we followed the 
requirements of previous literature. Unfortunately, the survey does not contain income 
information, thus social class was approximated using other variables. On the one 
hand, we have individuals’ education level as well as variables on individuals’ 
profession, in particular, whether the individuals own a factory and whether the 
individual is self-employed. This variable was included to examine whether there is 
some self-interest in secession and national identity as some authors claim (Breton, 
1969; 1978). One might argue that current elites are those who might lose the most 
with secession, especially from the short-term adjustments and uncertainty-associated 
costs that result from setting up a new institution. On the other hand, as is well known 
in the economic psychology literature, economic agents might experience loss 
aversion (Kanheman and Tversky, 1979). These variables also interact with national 
identity determinants, as far as education is a key information channel.   
 
Other variables refer to individuals’ language in line with other studies9. This 
allows us to estimate a reduced form of the individual’s identity   containing 
individuals’ language as being Euskera and socio-economic determinants such as the 
individuals’ birth in the Basque Country; while arguably Breton (1978) explicitly 
deals with the role of language and nationalist policies. Language is envisaged as a 
form of ‘distinctiveness’, although it can be argued that it stands as a way of inclusion 
                                                 
9 In models of referendum decision–making,  (Nadeau et al, 1999 and Clark, 2003) include cultural and 
linguistic benefits-costs resulting from proximity of the primary language with the one spoken by the 
respondent. Nadeau et al (1999) include a variable for risk reluctance and national identity. 
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and social cohesion, especially when the lingua franca is in any case a foreign 
language for citizens of the NS, such as English for Spanish.  Basque origin might be 
seen as a proxy of individuals’ benefits from secession as secession might arguably 
lead to a transfer of central power to the Basque Country, which we hypothesise, is 
more likely to be seen as a benefit for those of Basque origin. On the other hand, 
those whose origin is in Spain might, on average, be more likely to support the status 
quo. Furthermore, age and gender stand as important determinants of ones identity 
and attitudes. The younger the individual, the more exposed he might be regarded to 
be to policies from the regional Basque government which promote national identity. 
On the other hand, gender might affect an individual’s interest in politics as well as 
risk aversion (Levin, Snyder, and Chapman, 1988). Other control variables included 
in the model are the size of the locality individuals live in as well as the province.  
 
 
5. Results 
 
 
Table 1 provides the responses observed from the survey in relation to the 
question of secession. Interestingly, about 29% supported secession while 33% stand 
against it, while as many as 33% did not express an answer to the question. Non-
answers might result from lack of information on the costs of benefits or simply from 
lack of interested in the issue, among other reasons. This indicates that, on the basis of 
the survey, there would still be significant uncertainty in predicting secession, as there 
is no reason to allocate them to one side or the other. However, a first result indicates 
that individuals perceive their option to be strongly supported by others. This is 
consistent with the view that national identity is a shared perception of an imagined 
community rather than an individualistic attitude towards some state structure.  
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
Yet in order to examine individuals’ responses to the question on secession 
and national identity we deleted DK after estimating a sample selection model, which 
indicated that DK answers exerted no influence on the empirical model and 
accordingly the preference for secession and don’t know responses can be estimated 
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separately10..  Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of the three variables we are 
interested in examining. In particular, we find that 40% of the sample sees the Basque 
Country as their nation while 38% would support secession and 32% perceive that 
others would support secession. This inversion results from the fact that DK was 
larger in individuals’ support rather than in the perception of other’s support, a 
significant share of the DK.  Other relevant variables indicate that 75% were born in 
the Basque Country, and 50% understand the Basque language (Euskera).  
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
The first two columns of Table 3 examine the determinants of individuals’ 
support for secession and national identity assuming two independent processes, and 
the next columns deal with the coefficients of a bivariate probit model, which 
examines whether the error terms are correlated. Interestingly, as expected from the 
theoretical model, both decisions are highly correlated and not independent. The 
coefficient indicating (in) dependence of the error terms ρ is positive and significant, 
suggesting that there are common unobserved factors that indicate that the expansion 
of the Basque  national identity leads  to an increase the thre probability of  support to 
secession. The determinants of secession indicate no evidence of self-interest or the 
contrary. Being a company owner or self-employed does not influence the preference 
for secession of a stronger national identity. However, we find that those that are 
highly educated seem to oppose secession. Contrary to Breton’s (1964) predictions, 
these results indicate that lower socio-economic groups are more likely to support 
secession. An explanation might be due to the fact that elites in the Basque Country 
have traditionally been pro-Spanish, and thus lower socio-economic groups might 
intend to substitute pre-existing elites.   
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
On the other hand, variables associated with identity, which according to our 
model refer to the respondent speaking Euskera and/or being born in the Basque 
Country, are positively associated with support for secession. Younger ages were 
                                                 
10 The coefficient of a sample selection was rejected using the conventional log–likelihood test 
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more likely to exhibit  higher support as well as national identity, which in turn 
indicate that new generations are more likely to be influenced by pro-nationalistic 
policies. Furthermore, as explained, males are more likely to support secession than 
females, which might indicate some risk aversion, which has been to be linked to 
gender. Finally, those from smaller localities and from Bizkaia are more likely to 
support secession and to envisage the Basque Country as their nation. 
 
Yet, next is to examine the perceptions of others’ support for secession jointly 
with national identity, which is displayed in Table 4. Again, the ρ  coefficient 
indicates that both processes are not independent.  Interestingly, education, unlike 
individuals’ support, is not significant, which indicates that regardless of social 
position or information gathering, it does not influence perceptions of others’ 
behaviour. In fact, perceptions of others’ behaviour are associated with individuals’ 
language and origin. Again, this confirms the role of national identity in creating a 
conception of others’ action following the conception of a nation as an imagined 
community. An alternative and compatible explanation is that individuals’ perceived 
attitudes towards their community might refer to those of the social environment they 
are immersed in, rather than to the whole community. As before, gender is positively 
associated with individuals’ perceptions of others’ support for secession. Age was 
significantly associated with a higher perception of others’ support, as well as national 
attachment, which in turn indicates that the new generation is more likely to be 
influenced by pro-nationalist policies.  
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
Furthermore, one might wish to examine the overall effect of national identity 
on individuals’ actions, by examining the conditional probabilities of individuals’ and 
perceptions of other individuals’ support for secession (Table 5). Interestingly, 57% 
of those individuals that envisage the Basque Country as their nation support 
secession, whereas this figure is only 9% for those that do not. Conversely, only 17% 
of those whose nation is the Basque Country would not support secession.  This 
provides strong evidence for Akerlof and Kranton’s (2000) theory of identity. Indeed, 
preferences for the institutional organisation of the Basque Country might 
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significantly shift depending on people’s attachment to national identity.  Similar 
patterns apply to individuals’ perceptions of others’ support of secession. 51% of 
those whose nation is the Basque Country would support secession, while 16% would 
not and only 18% would not support it while being Basques.  Yet, if we separate the 
sample predictions by certain determinants such as age, those speaking Euskera and 
those from Bizkaia, we find that support for secession given national attachment to 
the Basque country is between 70-80% and perception of support is between 50 and 
60%.  
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
Finally, Table 6 provides additional econometric tests of the reliability of our 
estimates by reporting the restrictive specifications of the two variables of interest. 
That is, the propensity of supporting state opting-out (and the perceptions of other’s 
opting-out support) but among those who’s with Basque national identity and 
similarly, the individual’s propensity of adopting a Basque national identity among 
only those that support state opting-out. We find that interestingly gender is positively 
associated with support (and perceptions of other support) for state opting-out but not 
for national identity. Once we restrict the sample, we find that self-employed are less 
likely to support opting-out, but not to perceive other’s peoples as supporting opting 
out and national identity, whilst company owners are both more likely to be support 
both opting out, to perceive other peoples supporting the opting out option and, to 
adhere to Basque identity. Finally, by restricting the sample to those who reveal their 
Basque national identity and those who support secession we find relevant regional 
determinants as significant. In particular, Bizkaia exhibits a higher support for non-
secessionist national identity, Guipuzcoa exhibits a higher perception of other peoples 
support for state opting –out and both provinces are associated with Basque national 
identity restricted to those supporting state opting-out.  
 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
6. Conclusion  
 
This paper is a first attempt to address the role of national identity as 
determining collective preferences for latent secession drawing from an example of a 
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SLN as the Basque Country. In conducting an empirical application to the Basque 
Country we find evidence that national attachment to the Basque national identity is 
the result of an individual decision, which is not independent of individuals’ support 
for secession. Interestingly, this evidence provides some predictive power to the 
Akerloff and Kranton (2002) model applied to separatists’ politics, which could be 
extended to other areas. . Furthermore, this paper can be seen as a contribution to the 
limited literature on the determinants of individuals’ support for secession. In 
particular, we find evidence that both individuals’ support for perceptions of others’ 
support for secession are closely associated with national identity, which in turn might 
be regarded as a collective good. Therefore, according to our empirical evidence, one 
might argue that the political maintenance or change of the status quo is closely 
dependent on individuals’ identity. According to Norton (1988), politics is a matter of 
identity and, therefore, by shifting peoples identities and causing different emotions 
politicians might affect people’s preferences for the status quo.  
 
Unlike classical literature on the economics of nationalism (Breton, 1965), 
there is limited evidence of self-interest as explaining individual’s preferences for 
secession and national identity. We cannot totally rule out the hypothesis that national 
elites might succeed in their aims of convincing the population on the benefits of 
secession and it should be acknowledged that the survey lacked information on 
individuals’ income. However, our results suggest that some instrumental national 
attachments are not found to be significant. Indeed, being    company owner and self-
employed does not increase the likelihood of either supporting or rejecting secession.  
On the other hand, the “expected” role of language and national origin as boosting 
preferences for secession and national identity is confirmed, and has been found to 
enhance significant predictive power in determining preferences for secession 
(Breton, 1978). Therefore, secession might be envisaged as a tool to guarantee the 
permanence and promotion of a language and a specific culture when is perceived as 
threaten by the presence of a dominant culture and language.  Finally, risk aversion 
arguably exerts some influence through gender, although further research should 
provide more hints on these patterns.  
 
Another issue is whether individuals’ expressed preferences would translate 
into political and collective action. According to Maxwell and Oliver (1993), rational, 
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self-interested individuals will not voluntarily act to achieve their common or group 
interests. This results from the fact that because nationality is a public good, rational 
actors which might not receive immediate psychological mechanisms from opting out 
might prefer to free ride. That is, letting others pay the tangible and psychological cost 
of promoting secession while if happens to succeed everyone will benefit. However, 
this feature is likely to depend on the social interactions and the influence of formal 
and informal mechanisms within specific societies to promote collective action 
 
Implications for institutional deign are important. First, expansion of national 
identity in previous region-states might open the door to certain stateless nations to 
become independent states. Second, secession might be an instrument to foster 
collective identity further to what decentralised nation-states already allow.  Third, 
although there is sizeable share of the population in favour of secession in the Basque 
Country, the experience from Quebec indicates that there might be a staus quo bias 
which arguably favouring a “yes” vote (Clarke et al, 2004).  Furthermore, one might 
expect that from the unitary government there would be an interest in keeping the 
country as part of Spain, as still having a larger population implies power. Therefore, 
nationalist policies in the Basque Country might in turn be counteracted by anti-
secessionist policies from the central government, though.  Nation-States might need 
to adopt a more ´flexible´ institutional shape where heterogeneity of national identity 
casts with heterogeneity in political power within region-states.   Off course results 
here refer only to one year and no causality can be claimed, instead we have reported 
evidence of an association between identity and secession support that might point out 
that indetity matters for institutional decision and collective action to take place.  
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Table 1. Individual perception of secession in the Basque Country 
 
 ja *
 
ja− ** 
Support 29.09 32.84 
Against 33.76 39.97 
DK 33.28 20.63 
N/A 3.87 6.57 
Questions:  *Would you personally support an independent Basque Country? 
**Do you think that the majority of the citizens of the Basque Country would back  self-determination? 
 
 
 
Table 2. Variable definition and descriptive statistics 
 
Variables Type Definition Mean s.e 
Dependent variables 
jI  D My Nation is the ‘Basque Country’ 0.406 0.011 
jA  
D Support an ‘Independent Basque
Country’ 0.38 0.011 
jA−  
D Other perceived support for an
‘independent Basque Country’ 0.32 0.011 
Independent variables 
Age C Respondent age in years 45.144 0.385 
Origin D Born in the Basque Country 0.732 0.010 
Euskera D Understands Euskera  0.494 0.011 
Local C Locality size 3.830 0.029 
Educsup D University degree attainment 0.231 0.010 
Company_O D Owns a company  0.036 0.004 
Self_E D Self-employed 0.108 0.007 
Gender D Male 0.505 0.011 
Alaba D Province of Araba 0.294 0.010 
Guipuzkoa D Province of Guipuzkoa 0.327 0.011 
Bizkaia D Province of Bizkaia 0.379 0.011 
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Table 3. Determinants of individuals opting out and national identity 
 
 jA  jI  jA  jI  
 coeff s.e coeff s.e coeff s.e coeff s.e 
Age 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 
Gender 0.158b 0.062 0.194a 0.061 0.151a 0.062 0.191a 0.061 
Company_O -0.114 0.169 -0.031 0.163 -0.114 0.167 -0.026 0.163 
Self_E -0.147 0.103 0.022 0.099 -0.139 0.103 0.015 0.099 
Educsup  -0.249a 0.075 -0.093 0.073 -0.243a 0.075 -0.090 0.073 
Euskera  0.882a 0.071 0.694a 0.069 0.870a 0.070 0.693a 0.068 
Origin  0.631a 0.084 0.597a 0.080 0.631a 0.083 0.595a 0.080 
Guipuzkoa 0.121 0.083 0.234a 0.081 0.145 0.083 0.246a 0.081 
Bizkaia 0.215a 0.079 0.243a 0.076 0.225a 0.079 0.250a 0.077 
Local  -0.100a 0.025 -0.008 0.025 -0.099a 0.025 -0.007 0.025 
Intercept -1.135 0.186 -1.291a 0.182 -1.132a 0.185 -1.297a 0.181 ρ      0.759 0.022   
LR ( 0=ρ )    116.0    
McFadden 2R    0.1565  0.12      
Log-Likelihood -1088.62  -1161.41  -1999.6    
LR Test 403.87  305.65      
     Wald  220χ    440.15    
Note: a Significant at 1%, bSignificant at 5% 
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Table 4. Determinants of individuals’ perceptions  of other constituents  opting 
out and national identity 
 
 jA−  jA−  jI  
 coeff s.e coeff s.e coeff s.e 
Age 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
Gender 0.175a 0.062 0.173a 0.062 0.198a 0.061 
Company_O 0.249 0.161 0.252 0.158 -0.024 0.160 
Self_E 0.000 0.100 -0.002 0.100 0.020 0.099 
Educsup -0.087 0.074 -0.087 0.074 -0.089 0.072 
Euskera 0.658a 0.071 0.657a 0.071 0.692a 0.069 
Origin 0.446a 0.083 0.439a 0.082 0.592a 0.080 
Guipuzkoa 0.105 0.083 0.122 0.082 0.241a 0.081 
Bizkaia 0.174b 0.078 0.183b 0.078 0.245a 0.077 
Local -0.011 0.025 -0.011 0.025 -0.011 0.025 
Intercept -1.356a 0.186 -1.346 0.185 -1.274a 0.182 ρ    0.543 0.031   
LR ( 0=ρ )   215.6   
McFadden 2R  0.0871      
Log-Likelihood -1114.56  -2168.17    
LR Test 212.58      
Wald  220χ   366.86   
Note: a Significant at 1%, bSignificant at 5% 
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Table 5. Conditional estimated probabilities of opting out and perceptions of 
other opting out 
 
 Probability s.e 
Total   
Pr( 11 == jj IA ) 0.57 0.044 
Pr( 01 == jj IA ) 0.09 0.003 
Pr( 10 == jj IA ) 0.17 0.010 
Pr( 11 ==− jj IA ) 0.51 0.027 
Pr( 01 ==− jj IA ) 0.16 0.010 
Pr( 10 ==− jj IA ) 0.18 0.012 
Sample <30 year old   
Pr( 11 == jj IA ) 0.73 0.021 
Pr( 11 ==− jj IA ) 0.60 0.025 
Sample  Euskera =1   
Pr( 11 == jj IA ) 0.78 0.02 
Pr( 11 ==− jj IA ) 0.59 0.01 
Sample Bizkaia =1   
Pr( 11 == jj IA ) 0.68 0.04 
Pr( 11 ==− jj IA ) 0.53 0.03 
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Table 6. Conditional individuals support for opting out (and of other 
constituents support) and conditional national identity 
  
 
 P(  /  jA )1=jI P(  /  jA− )1=jI P(  /  jI )1=jA
 coeff s.e coeff s.e coeff s.e 
Age 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.760 0.001 0.004 
Gender 0.396b 0.149 0.330b 0.145 0.307 0.166 
Company_O 0.713a 0.114 0.388a 0.107 0.405a 0.126 
Self_E -0.157a 0.043 -0.019 0.037 0.038 0.043 
Educsup -0.161 0.246 0.077 0.225 -0.265 0.227 
Euskera -0.142 0.159 0.055 0.145 0.185 0.181 
Origin 0.058 0.829 0.390 0.791 -0.248 0.804 
Guipuzkoa 0.175 0.101 0.192b 0.092 0.261b 0.107 
Bizkaia -0.518a 0.143 -0.214 0.125 0.357b 0.151 
Local -0.244 0.138 -0.031 0.123 0.209 0.125 
Intercept 0.463 0.313 -0.461 0.287 -0.191 0.311 
McFadden 2R  0.10  0.03  0.05  
Log-Likelihood -416.96  -556.11  -366.95  
LR Test 87.02  31.74  34.2  
Note: a Significant at 1%, bSignificant at 5% 
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